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ANDAMUS relief is available when a party demonstrates that
a lower court abused its discretion in making its decision and
that party has no adequate remedy by appeal. This article ana-
lyzes, categorizes, and summarizes eighteen mandamus opinions written
by the Texas Supreme Court between November 1, 2009 and December
31, 2010 and demonstrates how, in each case, the supreme court ad-
dressed the proof required to obtain mandamus relief. Further, this arti-
cle particularly focuses on the Texas Supreme Court's treatment of the
second, somewhat ephemeral element of mandamus-that the appellate
remedy is inadequate.2 There are no clear and hard rules in the process
of determining whether an appellate remedy is adequate. Rather, it re-
1. Note that the Survey period for this edition of the Texas Survey is November 1,
2009 through September 30, 2010. We determined, however, the opinions released through
December 31, 2010 were instructive and informative in demonstrating the court's approach
to mandamus.
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2. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004). The classic
language for the second element of the mandamus test is that "persons seeking mandamus
relief [must] establish the lack of an adequate appellate remedy .... " Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). In Prudential, the court used the phrase "no adequate
remedy by appeal." Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135-36. The case law cited in this article
uses other, slightly different language, including "appeal is not adequate" and "no ade-
quate remedy at law." In re ENESCO Offshore Int'l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex. 2010)
(per curiam); In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (orig. proceed-
ing). However, as is apparent in Part IV of the Survey there is no difference in meaning
between the phrases. See discussion infra Part IV.
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quires a "careful balance of jurisprudential considerations."'3
The statistics on mandamus petitions filed or addressed during 2010
demonstrate that mandamus relief is reserved by the court as an ex-
traordinary remedy. 4 In 2010, the supreme court issued sixteen opinions
covering twenty petitions for writ of mandamus. 5 Of those cases, oral
argument was heard in only four cases. 6 One of those oral arguments
covered four consolidated writs.7 Broader statistics on the volume of
mandamus cases evaluated and disposed of are only available for the su-
preme court's fiscal year, which runs from September 1st through August
31st. 8 Those figures, however, are instructive. During the 2010 fiscal
year, 276 new petitions were filed with the court, while 288 cases were
disposed. 9 Of the dispositions, 69% were denied and 10.4% were condi-
tionally granted.10
The case of In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America set the current applica-
ble standard for determining when an appellate remedy is adequate."1
While the Texas Supreme Court in Prudential followed the basic, time-
honored requirements for mandamus, the supreme court also announced
a departure from the more "rigid rules" previously articulated in its 1992
Walker v. Packer opinion. 12 The supreme court declared the determina-
tion of whether an appellate remedy is adequate "is not an abstract or
formulaic one; it is practical and prudential.' 3 Finally, the supreme
3. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136 ("The operative word, 'adequate', [sic] has no
comprehensive definition; it is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential
considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceed-
ings to review the actions of lower courts.")
4. See id. at 138 ("Mandamus . . . is an extraordinary remedy. ) (quoting
Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993)).
5. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)
(covering four petitions); In re Scheller, 325 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In
re 24R, 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re B.T., 323 S.W.3d 158 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In
re Merrill Lynch & Co., 315 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re ENSCO Off-
shore Int'l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding): In re Odyssey Healthcare,
Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy
Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (covering two petitions); In
re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Laibe Corp.,
307 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d
299 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 306 S.W.3d
246 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d 819 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding); In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. 2010) (orig.
proceeding).
6. In re Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d; In re Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d; In re
Olshan, 328 S.W.3d; In re United Servs., 307 S.W.3d.
7. In re Qlshan, 328 S.W.3d.
8. See generally SUPREME COURT ACTIVlTY, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/
AR2010/sc/2-sc-activity.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 3.
11. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
12. Id. at 136.
13. Id.
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court concluded: "An appellate remedy is 'adequate' when any benefits
to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments. When the bene-
fits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the
appellate remedy is adequate. 14
In Part II of this article, The Basics of Mandamus, we describe the
mandamus jurisdiction of Texas appellate courts and the standard of
proof a petitioner must meet in order to obtain relief. This foundation
will facilitate a better understanding of the Texas Supreme Court manda-
mus opinions on which we focus. In Part III of the article, Survey of
Recent Supreme Court Mandamus Cases, we describe each of the eigh-
teen mandamus opinions issued during the survey period. The descrip-
tion of each case provides a basis for comparison of the court's treatment
regarding the standard of proof for particular subjects. Finally, in Part
IV, The Texas Supreme Court's Treatment of the "Adequacy" Require-
ment, we address the methods the supreme court used to analyze the ade-
quacy of appellate remedy. The supreme court's analysis of this
mandamus element ranges from a detailed analysis, to conclusory state-
ments, to no reference at all. Regardless of how the supreme court ad-
dresses this "adequacy" element, we conclude that mandamus remains an
extraordinary and sparingly granted remedy.
II. THE BASICS OF MANDAMUS
Before embarking on a survey of the Texas Supreme Court's manda-
mus decisions in late 2009 and 2010, we first describe briefly the statutory
jurisdiction and requisite proof of this "extraordinary remedy" 15 for "re-
view of significant rulings in exceptional cases .... -16 Although this dis-
cussion will not cover Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
a party seeking mandamus relief must recognize that Rule 52 is to be
strictly followed.17 For example, defects in the petition's form may lead
to summary dismissal. 18 A court may similarly deny relief to a party that
fails to properly authenticate evidence offered in support of its petition.' 9
A. STATUTORY JURISDICTION FOR MANDAMUS
The statutory jurisdiction over writs of mandamus is rooted in sections
of the Texas Constitution and Texas Government Code, as well as other
14. Id.
15. Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) ("Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court.").
16. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
17. See TEX. R. App. P. 52; see, e.g., In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758-59 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding).
18. See Butler, 270 S.W.3d at 758 (petition for writ of mandamus was denied because,
inter alia, the petition was not properly certified in accordance with TEX. R. App. P.
52.30)).




statutes.20 Each of Texas's fourteen appellate courts "may issue a writ of
mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the
court.12 1 The courts of appeals may additionally issue writs of mandamus
respecting a "(1) judge of a district or county court in the court of appeals
district; or (2) judge of a district court who is acting as a magistrate at a
court of inquiry under Chapter 52, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the
court of appeals district."122 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has man-
damus jurisdiction respecting county and district court judges. 23 Only the
supreme court may issue writs of mandamus respecting Texas executive
offices or to "compel the performance of a judicial, ministerial, or discre-
tionary act or duty that, by state law, the officer or officers are authorized
to perform. '24 While the Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals
have concurrent jurisdiction over trial courts, the supreme court has the
final word because it may issue writs as to rulings of the courts of
appeals.25
B. MANDAMUS STANDARD OF PROOF
Generally, there are two categories of cases where a party may obtain
mandamus relief. First, relief may be sought respecting a ministerial act
of a court or an official.26 A party must meet three requirements to re-
ceive this type of mandamus relief: (1) "a legal duty to perform a non-
discretionary act," (2) "a demand for performance," and (3) "a refusal [to
act]." 27 The second type of mandamus relief (which is the focus of this
Survey) may be available respecting actions of a court to correct a clear
abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. 28 In
20. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002 (West 2011);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.221 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (West
2010).
21. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.221.
22. Id.; see also TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (courts of appeals have jurisdiction
to consider a petition for "writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty im-
posed by law in connection with the holding of an election ... regardless of whether the
person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer"); see also TEX. CONST. art V,
§ 6 (addressing judicial power of Texas courts and providing courts of appeals shall have
"jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law").
23. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(c).
24. Id.
25. See id. § 22.002.
26. See, e.g., De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 2, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (manda-
mus relief sought in criminal case to compel the trial judge to either recuse himself "or to
refer [the] recusal motions for another judge to decide"); see also O'Connor v. First Ct.
App., 837 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (member of the court of appeals
sought mandamus to compel the court of appeals to direct its clerk to file her dissent
regarding the court's decision to refuse hearing a case en banc); In re Cullar, 320 S.W.3d
560, 562 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding) (mandamus sought to compel party
officials to remove allegedly disqualified nominee); In re Cercone, 323 S.W.3d 293, 294
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding) (mandamus sought to compel party official not
to certify a candidate and to order election official not place candidate on the ballot).
27. O'Connor, 837 S.W.2d at 97; Cullar, 320 S.W.3d at 564; Cercone, 323 S.W.3d at
297.
28. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. pro-
ceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).
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light of our focus on the supreme court's treatment of the adequacy of the
appellate remedy test, we will briefly address the history of this standard.
From at least 1992 to 2004, appellate courts evaluated the adequacy of
a petitioner's appellate remedy by a somewhat "rigid" rule.29 However,
in the 2004 case of Prudential, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a more
flexible approach.30 Specifically, the supreme court granted mandamus
relief to enforce a jury waiver using a less "rigid," and more "practical
and prudential" approach.31 According to the supreme court: "The oper-
ative word, 'adequate', has no comprehensive definition; it is simply a
proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that deter-
mine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to
review the actions of lower courts."' 32 Furthermore, the relevant "consid-
erations implicate both public and private interests. '33 In describing the
supreme court's shift away from the more "rigid" approach in Walker, the
Prudential opinion stated:
[A]lthough this Court has tried to give more concrete direction for
determining the availability of mandamus review, rigid rules are nec-
essarily inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy's principal
virtue. Thus, we wrote in Walker v. Packer that "an appellate remedy
is not inadequate merely because it may involve more expense or
delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ." While this is certainly
true, the word "merely" carries heavy freight. 34
The supreme court continued, saying that "whether an appellate rem-
edy is 'adequate' so as to preclude mandamus review depends heavily on
the circumstances presented and is better guided by general principles
than by simple rules."'35
Even though the rule stated in Prudential was to be less "rigid," the
supreme court appears to apply a somewhat "rigid" approach in evaluat-
ing the adequacy of the appellate remedy where mandamus is sought to
vacate a lower court's order compelling arbitration. 36 One example is the
2009 case of In re Gulf Exploration.37 There, the Texas Supreme Court
granted mandamus relief and ordered the court of appeals to vacate its
29. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136-37 (describing the supreme court's treatment of
petitions for writ of mandamus following Walker).
30. See id. at 136.
31. Id. at 136, 139.
32. Id. at 136.
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal citations omitted).
35. Id. at 137. "Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be
essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss,
allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would other-
wise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public
the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted
proceedings. An appellate remedy is 'adequate' when any benefits to mandamus review
are outweighed by the detriments. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate
courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate." Id. at 136 (emphasis
added).
36. See In re Gulf Exploration, 289 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Tex. 2009).
37. See id. at 836.
2011]
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order that a trial court reverse an order compelling arbitration. 38 The
supreme court described the narrow availability of mandamus in this
area, concluding a party seeking mandamus relief to set aside orders com-
pelling arbitration under the Texas Arbitration Act "can rarely meet" the
critical requirement for mandamus-that there is no adequate remedy by
appeal-because an error in compelling arbitration can "be reviewed by
final appeal." 39 The supreme court further noted that an incorrect order
compelling arbitration may cause "the parties [to] waste time and money
in arbitration. Standing alone, delay and expense generally do not render
a final appeal inadequate. ' 40 The supreme court reasoned that the party
could recover attorney fees and expenses incurred in arbitration after the
appeal, should an appellate court determine a trial court erred in compel-
ling arbitration.41
With this understanding of mandamus, we turn now to our survey of
recent Texas Supreme Court mandamus cases.
III. SURVEY OF RECENT SUPREME COURT
MANDAMUS CASES
The mandamus opinions issued by the Texas Supreme Court during the
Survey period cover a wide range of topics such as arbitration, discovery,
grandparent access, and more. This section briefly states the facts of each
case and explains how the supreme court analyzed the adequacy of the
party's appellate remedy. In Part IV, we highlight some trends and simi-
larities across the opinions as to the supreme court's discussions of the
adequacy of the appellate remedy.
38. Id. at 843.
39. See id. at 842 (citing In re Palacios, 221 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2006) (mandamus
relief generally unavailable for orders compelling arbitration)).
40. Id. (emphasis added). One may question whether the "standing alone" language
in Gulf Exploration is a return to the "merely" language in Walker that appeared to create
a rigid standard, and from which the court appeared to move away in Prudential. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). "[W]e
wrote in Walker v. Packer that 'an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it
may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ.' While this is
certainly true, the word 'merely' carries heavy freight." Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992)). See also In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 315 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex.
2010) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (The preservation of arbitration rights demonstrated
where mandamus imposed a stay of companion litigation because "[a]llowing [the] claims
to proceed could moot the arbitration ... and undermine Merrill Lynch's bargained-for
arbitration rights."); In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. 2010) (orig.
proceeding) (2010) (In concluding that error in refusing to compel arbitration must not
await appellate review, the supreme court stated that "we have determined that relators
have no adequate remedy by appeal when a trial judge erroneously refuses to compel arbi-
tration under the FAA.").
41. Gulf Exploration, 289 S.W.3d at 842-43 ("[A]rbitration clauses are usually con-
tractual .... A party that prevails on a contractual claim can recover its fees and expenses,
even if they were incurred in collateral proceedings like arbitration.").
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A. MANDAMUS AND ARBITRATION
1. Trial Court's Refusal to Compel Arbitration
The foundation for the Texas Supreme Court's recent cases in this area
relates back to late 2009. In the case of In re Golden Peanut Company,
LLC, the Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus where a trial court
refused to compel arbitration in a wrongful death suit.42 Here, a de-
ceased employee of Golden Peanut Company "was a party to an em-
ployee benefit plan that contained an agreement to arbitrate" wrongful
death claims against the company. His family sued Golden Peanut Com-
pany because the decedent received a fatal injury during the course of his
employment. The trial court refused the company's motion to compel
arbitration.43 The Eastland Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief,
concluding that because the decedent's family members were not signato-
ries to the arbitration agreement, they were not bound by it.44 During
the period between the Eastland court's opinion and the supreme court's
Golden Peanut decision, however, the supreme court concluded in In re
Labatt Food Service that "a decedent's pre-death arbitration agreement
binds his or her wrongful death beneficiaries because, under Texas law,
the wrongful death cause of action is entirely derivative of the decedent's
rights."'45 Consequently, in light of Labatt, the failure of the decedent-
employee's family members to sign the arbitration agreement was not a
bar to its enforcement. 46 Concluding that the trial court abused its discre-
tion for denying the motion to compel arbitration, the supreme court ana-
lyzed the adequacy of Golden Peanut Company's appellate remedy by
stating simply: "A party denied the right to arbitrate pursuant to an
agreement subject to the FAA does not have an adequate remedy by
appeal .... -47 The same or similar brief, conclusory statement as to the
adequacy of appellate remedy also appears in the 2010 arbitration man-
damus cases discussed below.
In the case of In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court
granted mandamus relief after a trial court refused to compel arbitration
in a negligence case.48 In Odyssey Healthcare, an employee claimed the
arbitration clause at issue was, among other things, substantively uncon-
scionable.49 The employee claimed in the trial court that arbitration in
Dallas, hundreds of miles away from her home and workplace, would be
prohibitively expensive. The trial court agreed, and the El Paso Court of
42. In re Golden Peanut Co., 298 S.W.3d 629, 630 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 630-31.
45. Id. at 631 (citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding)).
46. See id. at 630-31.
47. Id. at 631 (citing L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tex. 1999)).
48. In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419, 421 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding).
49. Id. at 422.
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Appeals denied Odyssey Healthcare's mandamus petition.50 However,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and concluded the em-
ployee "failed to establish that the arbitration clause [was] unconsciona-
ble."151 While the arbitration clause did require the selection of
arbitrators from a Dallas panel, it did not require the arbitration occur in
Dallas.52 The supreme court also observed the employee offered only
conclusory assertions about her costs. 53 Accordingly, the supreme court
determined the employee failed to meet her evidentiary burden of estab-
lishing the likelihood of incurring such costs by not providing "some spe-
cific information concerning those future costs."'5 4 Similar to the Golden
Peanut decision, the supreme court simply includes in its opinion a brief,
conclusory statement that "[m]andamus relief is appropriate because Od-
yssey has no adequate remedy by appeal. '55
In the case of In re 24R Inc., the Texas Supreme Court granted manda-
mus relief after a trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration in an
employment discrimination case. 56 This case involved an age and disabil-
ity discrimination suit by an at-will employee who signed multiple arbitra-
tion agreements during her fifteen-year tenure with The Boot Jack. 57 The
company moved the trial court to compel arbitration pursuant to the par-
ties' arbitration agreement. The trial court refused, and the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief.58 The employee ar-
gued, inter alia, that the agreement was illusory, and therefore unenforce-
able because The Boot Jack retained the right to modify the agreement. 59
The two key documents at issue were an employee manual and the arbi-
tration agreement. 60 In the employee manual, The Boot Jack reserved
"the right to revoke, change or supplement guidelines at any time without
notice. '61 Furthermore, the manual referenced the arbitration agreement
by stating that "there are a number of The Boot Jack policies an applicant
needs to understand and agree to before being employed, such as the
Arbitration Policy."' 62 The employee argued the modification language
50. Id. at 421-22.
51. Id. at 422.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. It is important to note this case arose from a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the FAA. Id. at 421. After September 1, 2009, relief from denial of a motion
to compel arbitration is no longer available by mandamus because there is an adequate
remedy by appeal. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.016 (West 2011) (al-
lowing for interlocutory appeals of orders denying arbitration pursuant to the FAA); see
also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (appeal of order denying appli-
cation to compel arbitration under section 171.021).
55. Odyssey Healthcare, 310 S.W.3d at 424 (citing In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d
566, 573 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)).
56. In re 24R Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
57. Id. at 565-66.
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id.
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from the manual also applied to the arbitration agreement, and thus the
agreement was illusory.63 The supreme court disagreed with the em-
ployee, stating that the two documents were entirely separate.64 "Al-
though language in the employee manual recognizes the existence of the
arbitration agreement, this does not diminish the validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement as a stand-alone contract. '65 Consequently, the supreme
court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused
to compel arbitration.6 6 Similar to Odyssey Healthcare, the supreme
court briefly addressed the adequacy of The Boot Jack's appellate remedy
stating that "[m]andamus relief is appropriate because The Boot Jack has
no adequate remedy by appeal. '67
In its final arbitration-related opinion of 2010, the Texas Supreme
Court decided four cases in a consolidated opinion entitled In re Olshan
Foundation Repair Co.68 Each case involved the allegedly faulty residen-
tial foundation repair completed by Olshan Foundation Repair Company
(Olshan) for four different Texas homeowners. 69 Three homeowners
signed contracts containing arbitration clauses that stated "any dispute
... shall be resolved by mandatory and binding arbitration administered
by the American Arbitration Association [ ] pursuant to the arbitration
laws in your state .... ",70 The fourth family's agreement was nearly iden-
tical, except that the arbitration would be administered "pursuant to the
Texas General Arbitration Act."'7 1 In each case, Olshan asked the respec-
tive trial courts to compel arbitration pursuant to these clauses; and in
each case the trial courts denied the motion. 72 The key issue before the
supreme court was whether these choice of law provisions invoked the
Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA").7 3 Under the TAA, the arbitration
agreements would be unenforceable because they were unsigned by the
homeowners' legal counsel.74 In the three cases where the agreements
stated arbitration would be governed "pursuant to the arbitration laws in
your state," the court concluded they did not invoke the Texas Arbitra-
tion Act. 75 "Courts rarely read such general choice-of-law provisions to
63. Id.
64. See id. at 568.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
68. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 885 (Tex. 2010).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 886-87.
71. Id. at 887.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 888.
74. Id. at 887-88. Under the TAA, an arbitration agreement for services of $50,000 or
less, must be signed by each party's attorney (among other requirements). Id. at 888 (cit-
ing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.002(a)(2)). None of the agreements in Olshan
were signed by the respective families' attorneys. Id. at 887.
75. Id. at 890.
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choose state law to the exclusion of federal law."'76 Additionally, the su-
preme court concluded that agreements in these three cases were not un-
conscionable for being prohibitively expensive as argued by the
homeowners.7 7Consequently, the supreme court concluded that the trial
courts erred by declining to compel arbitration as requested by Olshan.78
In contrast, in the one case where the arbitration agreement explicitly
invoked the TAA, the supreme court concluded the agreement was unen-
forceable under the Act because the homeowner's attorney did not sign
the arbitration agreement as required by statute.79 Similar to the other
arbitration-related mandamus opinions during the Survey period, the su-
preme court made a brief, conclusory statement that in the three cases
where the FAA applied, the appellate remedy was inadequate. 80 Specifi-
cally, the supreme court stated that "we have determined that relators
have no adequate remedy by appeal when a trial judge erroneously ref-
uses to compel arbitration under the FAA."8 1
2. Abating Litigation Pending Outcome of Related Arbitration
In the case of In re Merrill Lynch & Co., two affiliated corporations
sued Merrill Lynch with identical statutory and common law securities
claims.8 2 One plaintiff, MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. (Wireless), was a signa-
tory to an arbitration agreement with Merrill Lynch, while the other
plaintiff, MetroPCS Communications, Inc. (Communications), was not.
Merrill Lynch moved to compel arbitration and requested a stay of litiga-
tion while arbitration with Wireless was pending. The trial court com-
pelled arbitration for Wireless's claims, but refused to stay the companion
litigation during the pendency of arbitration.8 3 The court of appeals re-
fused mandamus relief compelling the trial court to grant the stay.8 4 The
Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus based upon its
earlier decision, In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., that addressed a similar
76. Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995)
and In re L & L Kempwood Assoc., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 n.16 (Tex. 1999)).
77. Id. at 891. The homeowners argued that the American Arbitration Association
charged fees that were so excessive, the parties would be unable to "vindicate their
claims." Id. However, the supreme court concluded they did not meet their burden to
provide "legally sufficient evidence that such fees [would] prevent the homeowners from
effectively pursuing their claim in the arbitral forum." Id. at 897.
78. Id. at 899. The three families also argued the arbitration agreements were uncon-
scionable because Olshan violated the Texas Home Solicitation Act. Id. at 897-98. The
court declined to grant relief on this ground because "a trial court 'may consider only
issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate"' and the
decision of whether the agreements were void on this ground should be decided in arbitra-
tion. Id. at 898 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404
(1967)).
79. Id. at 891.
80. Id. at 886-87.
81. Id. (citing In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001)).
82. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 315 S.W.3d 888, 889 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 890.
84. Id.
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fact situation.85 In the Trust case, the supreme court granted mandamus
relief to stay collateral litigation "to ensure that an issue two parties have
agreed to arbitrate is not decided instead in collateral litigation. ' 86 In
that case, the supreme court reasoned that "when an issue is pending in
both arbitration and litigation ... arbitration 'should be given priority to
the extent it is likely to resolve issues material to [that] lawsuit."87
In the 2010 Merrill Lynch opinion, the supreme court did not specifi-
cally address the issue of adequacy of remedy by appeal. However, the
court did note: "Allowing [the non-signatories'] claims to proceed could
moot the arbitration between [the signatory] and Merrill Lynch and un-
dermine Merrill Lynch's bargained-for arbitration rights."'88 Although
the supreme court did not articulate precisely how the arbitration agree-
ment may be mooted in the 2010 case, the court did analyze the mootness
issue in the Trust case. 89 There, the supreme court cited a federal case
that required arbitration to proceed first while litigation was stayed, and
noted the following observation from a federal court:
[There] are cases in which a party to an arbitration agreement, trying
to get around it, sues not only the other party to the agreement but
some related party with which it has no arbitration agreement, in the
hope that the claim against the other party will be adjudicated first
and have preclusive effect in the arbitration. Such a maneuver should
not be allowed to succeed ... [and] would require the court to stay
the proceedings before it and let the arbitration go forward
unimpeded.90
Although the supreme court did not specifically discuss the lack of an
adequate remedy in Merrill Lynch, the Merrill Lynch and Trust opinions
together demonstrate there is no adequate remedy by appeal for the facts
described.
B. MANDAMUS AND THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL
1. Trial Court Must State Specific Grounds in Order Granting a New
Trial
In the case of In re United States Scaffolding, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus and directed
a trial court to specify its reasons for setting aside a jury verdict and
granting a new trial.91 The decision was based on In re Columbia Medical
Center of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., a 2009 Texas Supreme Court de-
85. Id. at 891, 893 (citing In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.
2007)).
86. Id. at 892 (quoting Merrill Lynch Trust, 235 S.W.3d at 196)).
87. Id. at 891 (quoting Merrill Lynch Trust, 235 S.W.3d at 195)).
88. Id. at 893.
89. Merrill Lynch Trust, 235 S.W.3d at 195.
90. Id. (quoting IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir.
1996)).




cision where the supreme court concluded that a trial court abused its
discretion by disregarding a jury verdict and granting a new trial "in the
interest of justice and fairness. '92 In Columbia, the supreme court held a
trial court abuses its discretion if it disregards a jury verdict and grants a
new trial but does not specifically set out its reasons. 93 In deciding United
Scaffolding, the supreme court rejected, without comment, the conten-
tions of the real party in interest that (1) mandamus is not the proper
vehicle to implement the change that would require trial judges to specify
reasons for granting a new trial, and (2) the benefits of a prompt retrial
outweigh the detriments of interlocutory appellate review. 94 The United
Scaffolding opinion included only a brief statement in its holding that
"United does not have an adequate appellate remedy" but did not discuss
the facts or reasons why an appeal was inadequate. 9
5
2. Granting a New Trial After the Expiration of Plenary Power
The case of In re Daredia involved a default judgment for unpaid credit
card accounts that was set aside after the trial court's plenary power ex-
pired. 96 At the plaintiff's request, the trial court signed a default judg-
ment against a corporate defendant that failed to answer.97 An individual
defendant had answered at that time. The language of the judgment sub-
mitted by the plaintiff, however, stated judgment by default was granted
against the corporate defendant and the individual defendant was not
mentioned. Additionally, the judgment contained the following lan-
guage: "All relief not expressly granted herein is denied. This judgment
disposes of all parties and all claims in this cause of action and is there-
fore FINAL." 98 Fifteen months later, the plaintiff recognized it had no
judgment against the individual defendant and "moved for judgment
nunc pro tunc to correct what it called 'typographical errors on behalf of
the attorney in charge', who 'should have used the word "Interlocutory"
in both the motion and judgment."' 99 The trial court granted the motion
despite the individual defendant's arguments that the judgment was final
and that the court no longer had plenary power over the matter. 10 0 The
court of appeals refused mandamus relief sought by the individual defen-
dant to set aside the judgment nunc pro tunc.10 1 The court concluded the
judgment was "ambiguous on its face" because it did not address the
claim against the individual defendant, thus it was interlocutory and the
92. Id. at 662 (citing In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290
S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009)).
93. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 207.
94. Id. at 215-16, 219-20 (O'Neill, J., dissenting) (these contentions were previously
advanced by the dissent in Columbia).
95. United Scaffolding, 301 S.W.3d at 663.
96. In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
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trial court retained jurisdiction. 10 2 However, the Texas Supreme Court
conditionally granted mandamus relief concluding the trial court abused
its discretion when it set aside a default judgment after its plenary power
expired. 10 3 Citing the seminal case of Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., the
supreme court concluded the judgment was not "ambiguous" and was not
an interlocutory judgment because the language of the judgment un-
equivocally indicated that it was a final judgment, despite its failure to
mention the individual defendant's name. 1°4 The supreme court deter-
mined "that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in setting aside a
judgment after its plenary power expired. 105 The supreme court then
stated, without elaboration, that the individual defendant had "no ade-
quate remedy at law."' 06
C. MANDAMUS AND DISCOVERY
The case of In re Deere & Co. arose from a discovery dispute.10 7 The
underlying case was a products liability suit between Arturo Martinez
and Deere & Company for injuries Martinez experienced after falling
under a Deere & Company backhoe loader. Claiming a step on the back-
hoe broke under his weight while it was moving, Martinez requested
Deere & Company produce "all [non-governmental] documents of cus-
tomer complaints received by [Deere] relative to the sidestep on any
model backhoe."' 08 Deere & Company objected, and at a hearing the
parties agreed to narrow the scope of the request to "documents relating
to models with similar handles and step assemblies, and only going back
approximately 12 to 15 years."' 0 9 Yet, the order submitted by Martinez
was much broader in scope and included over thirty product lines with no
time limit on their manufacture date. After hearing Deere's objections to
the order, the trial court signed the original order.110 The Texas Supreme
Court concluded that absence of a "reasonable time limit" made the or-
der overly broad and thus was an abuse of discretion.' Aside from stat-
ing the general rule that a party seeking mandamus must have no
adequate remedy by appeal, however, the court did not discuss the ade-
quacy of Deere's appellate remedy.112 The court stated, "An order that
compels overly broad discovery is an abuse of discretion for which man-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 250.
104. Id. at 249 (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001)).
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id. (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) and In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136-37 (Tex. 2004)).




111. Id. at 820-21. "Discovery orders requiring production from an unreasonably long
period.., are impermissibly overbroad." Id. (quoting In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149,
152 (Tex. 2003)).
112. See id. at 820.
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damus is the proper remedy."' 1 3
D. MANDAMUS AND THE ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION
1. A Void Order in Probate Court
In the case of In re John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Founda-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court embarked on a complex analysis of a pro-
bate court's lack of jurisdiction. Because the probate court's order was
void, the court concluded that the law did not require the relators to
demonstrate the lack of an adequate appellate remedy." 4 The supreme
court granted mandamus relief ordering a probate court to vacate its or-
ders relating to exhumation of a decedent's body. 1 5 Claiming to be a
decedent's non-marital child, Ann Fernandez filed a bill of review in the
probate court asserting her alleged father's "will did not dispose of his
real property" and "she [was] entitled to recover her intestate share. ' 16
She also filed three district court bills of review making her claims to
heirship and seeking to set aside a "decades-old judgment.' 1 7 The pro-
bate court granted Fernandez's motion to exhume decedent's body for
DNA testing. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief from that
exhumation order.' 8 The relators then filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus in the supreme court; that court granted a stay. In the meantime, the
trial court granted summary judgment that Fernandez take nothing in one
bill of review case where the judgment Fernendez attacked declared the
decedent died testate with no surviving children.11 9 The supreme court
concluded that "[a]lthough the merits of the probate court bills of review
... are not yet before us, we can conceive of no alternative means by
which Fernandez might successfully attack the final district court judg-
ment.' 20 Because there was "no pending probate proceeding ... the
court lacked jurisdiction to enter any order other than to dismiss.' 12 '
Consequently, the supreme court concluded that "the probate court's []
order was void" and "constituted an abuse of discretion, and mandamus
relief is appropriate without a showing that the relators lack an adequate
appellate remedy.'' 1 22
113. Id. (citing In re Graco Children's Prods., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam)).
114. In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex.
2010).
115. Id. at 523.
116. Id. at 520.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 521.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 522.
121. Id. (citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1994)).
122. Id. (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000)).
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2. Denial of a Plea to Jurisdiction and a Motion for Summary
Judgment
In the case of In re United Services Auto Association, the Texas Su-
preme Court granted mandamus relief after a trial court denied a plea to
jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment.12 3 An employee
brought an action in Bexar County county court at law against his em-
ployer, claiming age discrimination pursuant to the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act (TCHRA). At that time, the jurisdiction of that
county court included civil claims where "the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000, excluding interest, statutory or
punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs, as alleged
on the face of the petition.1 24 The petition only alleged that the dam-
ages exceeded the $500 statutory minimum, but omitted the statement
required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 47(b) that the "damages
sought are within the jurisdictional limits of the court .... ",125 In light of
the fact that the employee's salary during discharge was almost $74,000
and he alleged, among other things, his loss of income and benefits would
continue in the future if not for the rest of his life, the employer filed a
plea to the jurisdiction claiming the suit sought damages above the statu-
tory jurisdiction of the court. After the trial court denied the plea, the
employee amended his petition alleging $1.6 million in damages.' 26 The
court tried the case and the jury awarded actual damages aggregating
over $500,000.127 The employer appealed and the court of appeals af-
firmed, but the supreme court reversed and dismissed the suit, ruling that
the amount in controversy at the time the employee filed suit exceeded
the jurisdictional limits of the court.' 28
The employee refiled his claim in the district court and the employer
"filed a plea to jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment asserting"
that the two-year statute of limitations had run.129 The employee re-
sponded, arguing section 16.064 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
tolled the limitations period. The employer replied that the tolling stat-
ute was inapplicable because the first action was filed "with intentional
disregard of proper jurisdiction.' 130 "The trial court denied the plea and
motion [for summary judgment]" and "[t]he court of appeals denied
[mandamus] relief, concluding that [the employer] had not established
that its appellate remedy was inadequate."' 3'
In granting mandamus relief, the supreme court described the appro-
priate procedure for a trial court to determine whether a party filed a suit
123. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 307 S.W.3d 299, 305, 314 (Tex. 2010).
124. Id. at 304-05 (quoting TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 25.0003(c)(1)).
125. Id. at 305, 312 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 47(b)).








with "intentional disregard" for the court's jurisdiction, so as to bar asser-
tion of the tolling provision of section 16.064(a). 132 The supreme court
stated, "Once an adverse party has moved for relief under the 'inten-
tional disregard' provision, the nonmovant must show that he did not in-
tentionally disregard proper jurisdiction when filing the case. ' 133 The
supreme court also concluded, on the record before it, that even though
the plaintiff "subjectively anticipated a verdict within the jurisdictional
limits," he "unquestionably sought damages in excess of the [court's] ju-
risdiction. '134 The court stated the rule that "mandamus [relief] is gener-
ally unavailable when a trial court denies summary judgment .... ,,135
However, the supreme court concluded the extraordinary circumstances
on this record warranted mandamus relief because the employer had "al-
ready endured one trial in a forum that lacked jurisdiction . . . and is
facing a second trial on a claim that we have just held to be barred by
limitations. Two wasted trials are not '[t]he most efficient use of the
state's judicial resources."' "136 The supreme court continued by saying:
"Denying mandamus relief here would thwart the legislative intent that
non-tolled TCHRA claims be brought within two years... and we should
not 'frustrate th[at] purpose[ ] by a too-strict application of our own pro-
cedural devices. 1 37
E. MANDAMUS AND FORUM ISSUES
1. Refusing to Enforce a Forum Selection Clause May Constitute an
Abuse of Discretion
In the case of In re ADM Investor Services, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court conditionally granted mandamus relief after deciding a trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to enforce a forum selection clause and
dismissing the Texas suit.138 In the trial court, one defendant sought dis-
missal based on a forum selection clause that provided for suit in Illinois.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 139 The court of appeals de-
nied mandamus relief, concluding the defendant waived enforcement of
the clause.140 At the supreme court level, plaintiff asserted defendant
demonstrated waiver by, inter alia, substantially invoking the judicial pro-
cess to plaintiff's detriment when the defendant simultaneously filed an
answer, a motion to transfer to another Texas county, and a motion to
dismiss based on the clause. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed the defen-
dant demonstrated waiver by waiting approximately three months to re-
132. Id. at 311-12.
133. Id. at 312.
134. Id. at 313.
135. Id. at 314.
136. Id. (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996)).
137. Id. (quoting In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tex. 2008)).
138. In re ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 372-73 (Tex. 2010).
139. Id. at 373.
140. Id.
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quest a hearing on its motion to dismiss.14 1 The supreme court concluded
that "merely participating in litigation does not categorically mean the
party has invoked the judicial process so as to waive enforcement [of the
forum selection clause]. '142 Further, the supreme court concluded the
three month "gap" did "nothing 'unequivocal' to waive enforcement.'
'1 43
Finally, the supreme court concluded, "There is no adequate remedy by
appeal when a trial court refuses to enforce a forum-selection clause."'
1 44
Similar to ADM Investor Services, the case of In re Laibe Corp. also
involved a trial court's refusal to enforce a contractual forum-selection
clause.145 The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief and di-
rected the trial court to enforce the forum selection clause, and conse-
quently dismiss the suit. 146 The supreme court found the forum selection
clause in a purchase contract permitting a drilling rig buyer to sue only in
Indiana was enforceable by the seller, even though a prior invoice did not
include the clause. 147 The buyer contended that suing in Indiana would
disrupt its operations. However, the supreme court stated, "we will de-
cline to enforce a forum-selection clause against a party only if the incon-
venience it faces is so extreme as to effectively deny the party its day in
court.' 48 The buyer also contended that the court should deny manda-
mus relief because of the seller's lack of diligence in its first attempt to
obtain mandamus relief at the appellate level.149 The buyer claimed the
seller waited two months after the trial court's order to file its petition for
mandamus relief. The supreme court disagreed there was lack of dili-
gence, saying "[t]o invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, the moving
party ordinarily must show an unreasonable delay by the opposing party
in asserting it[s] rights, and also the moving party's good faith and detri-
mental change in position because of the delay.'1 50 The supreme court
concluded "there is no adequate remedy by appeal when a trial court
refuses to enforce a forum-selection clause.' 15
1
In its final 2010 forum selection mandamus case, the Texas Supreme
Court in In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc. granted mandamus relief after the
trial court denied a motion to dismiss for improper forum on the basis of
a contractual forum selection clause.152 A distributor alleged that a medi-
cal device manufacturer failed to inform the distributor of new products
and failed to give the distributor the right of first refusal. The supreme
court determined the claim arose from a contract containing the forum
141. Id. at 373-74.
142. Id. at 374.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 376.
145. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 318.
147. Id. at 315, 316-17.
148. Id. at 317.
149. Id. at 318.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 316 (quoting In re ADM Investor Servs., Inc. 304 S.W.3d 371, 376 (Tex.
2010)).
152. In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
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selection clause, rather than general obligations imposed by law. 153 Ac-
cordingly, the forum selection clause should be enforced. 154 In addition,
the supreme court discussed the appellate remedy in detail, stating that
"an appellate remedy is inadequate when a trial court improperly refuses
to enforce a forum-selection clause because allowing the trial to go for-
ward will 'vitiate and render illusory the subject matter of an appeal'-
i.e., trial in the proper forum. '' 155
2. Forum Non Conveniens and the Improper Denial of a Motion to
Dismiss
In In re ENESCO Offshore International Co., the Texas Supreme
Court granted mandamus relief ordering a trial court to dismiss a case,
thereby reversing the trial court's earlier ruling denying the defendant
corporations' motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 156
The widow of an Australian oil rig worker filed suit in Texas against her
husband's employer, an Australian company. The worker died on a rig
located near Singapore, and the majority of witnesses and physical evi-
dence was located in Singapore or Australia.157 In granting mandamus
relief, the court addressed six statutory considerations set out in section
71.051(b) of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. 158 The supreme
court noted, "Nothing in section 71.051 indicates the Legislature contem-
plated the denial of forum non conveniens motions because multiple ade-
quate alternate forums existed, or that a defendant should be required to
focus on only one alternate forum to the exclusion of other forums.' 159
Without discussion, the supreme court repeated its rule that "an appeal is
not adequate when a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
is erroneously denied.' 160
F. MANDAMUS AND A TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN APPLYING
APPELLATE DIRECTIONS
In the 2010 case of In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Sub-
sidiary, L.P., a defendant returned to the Texas Supreme Court for man-
damus relief shortly after the supreme court rendered judgment in that
party's favor by reducing the award of economic damages.161 The defen-
dant requested the trial court reduce the punitive damages on remand, as
153. Id. at 882, 884-85. "[A] claim is brought in contract if liability arises from the
contract, while a claim is brought in tort if liability is derived from other general obliga-
tions imposed by law." Id. at 884 (quoting In re Int'l Profit Assocs., 274 S.W.3d 672, 677
(Tex. 2009)).
154. Id. at 887.
155. Id. at 883 (quoting In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tex. 2004)).
156. In re ENESCO Offshore Int'l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
157. Id. at 923, 927.
158. Id. at 924-28.
159. Id. at 925; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (West 2011).
160. In re ENESCO, 311 S.W.3d at 923 (citing In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 685
(Tex. 2008)).
161. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 306 S.W.3d 246, 247 (Tex. 2010).
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required by a statutory cap, based on the supreme court's opinion that
reduced economic damages. 162 In granting mandamus relief, the su-
preme court determined the reduced economic damages judgment it pre-
viously rendered also required the reduction of punitive damages. 163 The
supreme court concluded, "Although our judgment did not also expressly
order a reduction of the award of punitive damages, it is what the statute
requires." 164 The supreme court then succinctly addressed the remedy by
appeal, saying "[b]ecause this issue arises in connection with a final judg-
ment following an appeal to this Court, we conclude that Columbia has
no other adequate remedy by appeal.' a65
G. MANDAMUS AND THE TRANSFER OF A JUVENILE TO ADULT
CRIMINAL COURT
In the case of In re B. T., the Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus
relief to prevent a judge from transferring a juvenile to district court for
trial as an adult, prior to the completion of a statutorily-mandated diag-
nostic evaluation. 166 This case involved a seventeen-year-old charged
with murder, whom the state sought to prosecute as an adult. Under the
Texas Family Code, a juvenile court may transfer a juvenile to adult court
under certain conditions, one of which is that the juvenile court must "or-
der and obtain a complete diagnostic study" of the child. 167 The juvenile
court ordered a diagnostic study, but the study could not be completed
according to a report that B.T. needed "inpatient psychiatric treatment
'in order to help him attain a minimal level of fitness to proceed' and
[should then] be reevaluated .... - 168 B.T. was then committed to a state
hospital for psychiatric treatment for ninety-days, at which point he was
deemed "fit to proceed" by a different doctor. 169 The juvenile court then
scheduled a hearing on B.T.'s transfer from juvenile court, despite the
repeated requests of both B.T. and the state that the requisite diagnostic
study be completed before holding any hearing. The juvenile court re-
fused, apparently because the court believed it had enough information
from the partial diagnostic study, the state hospital records from B.T.'s
psychiatric treatment, and a 2007 evaluation stemming from an unrelated
juvenile proceeding. 170 The supreme court concluded the juvenile court
abused its discretion by substituting these three reports for a "complete
diagnostic study" as required by statute.' 17 The supreme court did not
use the "adequate remedy by appeal" terminology or similar words.
Rather, the supreme court said "B.T. has no plausible appellate remedy,"
162. Id.
163. Id. at 248.
164. Id. at 247; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.008(b) (West Supp. 2010).
165. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 306 S.W.3d at 248.
166. In re B.T., 323 S.W.3d 158, 159 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 159 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(d) (West Supp. 2010)).
168. Id. at 160 (quoting the report of B.T.'s evaluator, Dr. Emily Fallis).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 162.
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because although he could appeal his transfer out of juvenile court, such
an appeal could only happen "after he has been convicted (or placed on
deferred adjudication) in adult court. By this time, 17-year-old B.T. likely
will have turned 18, and juvenile adjudication may be unavailable. 1 72
H. MANDAMUS AND GRANDPARENT ACCESS TO A CHILD
In the case of In re Richard Scheller, the Texas Supreme Court granted
mandamus relief in a grandparent-access suit.1 73 The supreme court con-
cluded the trial court abused its discretion in issuing temporary orders
giving a grandfather access to his grandchildren.1 74 The grandchildren
were two young daughters of Amanda Scheller, who passed away in 2007.
Although the children regularly visited their maternal-grandfather prior
to and for a year after their mother's death, the relationship between
their grandfather and father deteriorated. The grandfather eventually
filed suit for grandparent access, and the trial court issued temporary or-
ders giving the grandfather regular access through telephone, weekend
visits, and more.175 The supreme court cited In re Derzapf for the pro-
position that it is an abuse of discretion to grant temporary access to a
grandparent who does not "overcome the presumption that a parent acts
in his or her child's best interest by proving that 'denial ... of access to
the child would significantly impair the child's physical health or emo-
tional well-being.'I"176 The supreme court conditionally granted the fa-
ther's petition for mandamus relief, but did not discuss the adequacy of
appellate remedy. 177
I. MANDAMUS AND LAW FIRM DISQUALIFICATION
In the case of In re Columbia Valley Healthcare System, the Texas Su-
preme Court granted mandamus relief where the trial court refused to
disqualify a law firm, despite evidence that a legal assistant for the plain-
tiff's attorney had previously worked for the defendant's attorney.
1 78
During her tenure with the defendant's attorney, the legal assistant
worked on the underlying medical malpractice lawsuit against Columbia
Valley Healthcare System (Columbia Valley) from its inception. The as-
sistant left that firm, and joined the plaintiff's firm eleven months later
where she was orally instructed not to work on any cases that she had
worked on at the defense firm. 179 However, unknown to the plaintiff's
172. Id. (citing In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1999)).
173. In re Scheller, 325 S.W.3d 640, 641 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 641-42.
176. Id. at 643 (quoting In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 333 (Tex. 2007)).
177. Id. at 644. Note that the father in Scheller asked the court for relief from two of
the trial court's orders: the temporary order for grandparent access and the order ap-
pointing an expert to serve as a guardian ad litem for his daughters and as a psychologist to
evaluate the case. Id. Mandamus relief was granted only as to the order granting grandpar-
ent access. Id. at 645.
178. In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Tex. 2010).
179. Id. at 822-23.
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lawyer, she worked on the malpractice suit involving Columbia Valley.
Once the assistant's employment with the plaintiff's lawyer came to light,
Columbia Valley moved for disqualification of the plaintiff's firm.180 The
trial court denied the motion, and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
denied Columbia Valley's mandamus petition.181 The supreme court
granted mandamus relief, and in so doing, set forth a number of guide-
lines for trial courts to apply when considering disqualification of a law
firm based on a nonlegal employee. 182 Where a nonlegal employee has
"previously worked on the same or a substantially related matter for op-
posing counsel," the hiring firm must rebut a presumption that confi-
dences were shared.' 83 To do so, the firm must show: (1) it instructed the
employee not to work any matter on which the employee worked, or had
knowledge of, at the previous firm, and (2) "the firm took other reasona-
ble steps to ensure" the employee does not work on any such matters. 1
84
"These other reasonable steps must include, at a minimum, formal, insti-
tutional measures to screen the employee from the case."'18 5 The su-
preme court's discussion of appellate remedy was limited to a footnote in
its opinion's factual and procedural background section that stated:
"Mandamus is available where a motion to disqualify is inappropriately
denied as there is no adequate remedy on appeal.
18 6
IV. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE
"ADEQUACY" REQUIREMENT
Parties considering mandamus relief must heed the Texas Supreme
Court's directive in Prudential that reserves mandamus review for cases
where appellate remedy is inadequate.1 8 7 In the cases surveyed, how-
ever, subtle differences appear from decision to decision as to how the
supreme court evaluated the adequacy of appellate remedy. The chart set
out below describes these differences relative to the subject matter of the
case. During the Survey period, the court treated the appellate remedy
question in one of three manners identified by: 1) making a conclusory
statement that the appellate remedy is inadequate; 2) explaining why, in
that specific case, the appellate remedy is inadequate; or 3) not address-
ing the issue of the party's appellate remedy at all.
180. Id. at 823.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 828-29.
183. Id. at 828.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 823 n.2 (citing NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.
1989)).
187. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004).
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Appellate Remedy Opinion Name Case Topics
Discussion
A conclusory statement that
the appellate remedy is
inadequate
In re 24R Inc., 324 S.W.3d
564, 568 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam).
In re ADM Investor Servs.,
Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 376
(Tex. 2010).
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of
Las Colinas, 306 S.W.3d 246,
248 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam).
In re Columbia Valley
Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d
819, 823 n.2 (Tex. 2010).
In re ENESCO Offshore
Int'l Co., 311 S.W.3d 921,
923 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam).
In re Laibe Corp., 307
S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2010)
(per curiam).
In re Olshan Found. Repair
Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888
(Tex. 2010).
In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d
247, 250 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam).
In re Golden Peanut Co.,
298 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex.
2009) (per curiam).
In re Odyssey Healthcare,
310 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex.
2010) (per curiam).
In re John G. & Marie Stella
Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315
S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. 2010)
(orig. proceeding).
In re United Scaffolding,
Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 663
(Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
Arbitration
Discovery
Error in the application of
appellate directions
Forum issues
Granting a new trial
Lack of jurisdiction
Law firm disqualification
A specific discussion of the In re B.T., 323 S.W.3d 158, Forum issues
adequacy of the party's 162 (Tex. 2010) (per Transfer of a juvenile for
appellate remedy curiam). adult prosecution
In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc.,
310 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex.
2010) (per curiam).
No direct discussion of the In re Deere & Co., 299 Arbitration
adequacy of the party's S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) Grandparent access
appellate remedy. (per curiam). Discovery dispute
In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Summary judgment on
315 S.W.3d 888, 891-93 statute of limitations
(Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
In re Scheller, 325 S.W.3d
640, 646 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam).
In re United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 314
(Tex. 2010).
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As identified in the preceding chart, the supreme court's analysis of the
appellate remedy in the majority of mandamus opinions issued during the
Survey period has been limited to a succinct, conclusory statement that
the remedy is inadequate. In most cases, the conclusory statements cite
previous opinions explaining why appellate remedy is inadequate in simi-
lar fact situations.1 88 This point is illustrated by Daredia, where the su-
preme court cited In re Dickason when in stated "Daredia [had] no
adequate remedy at law."'189 The supreme court in Dickason made a sim-
ilar conclusory statement and cited Buttery v. Betts, a 1967 mandamus
opinion where a trial court granted a new trial after expiration of its ple-
nary power.1 90 In Buttery, the real party in interest argued the relators
were not entitled to mandamus because they could appeal the decision
after the new trial. 191 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed and concluded
the "[r]elators [were] entitled to their final judgment ... without estab-
lishing that right after a needless retrial and an appeal. 1 92
In contrast, the supreme court pointedly explained why the appellate
remedy was inadequate in its two opinions B.T. and Lisa Laser.193 In
B. T., the supreme court explained that "B.T. has no plausible appellate
remedy.... B.T. can appeal his transfer-but only after he has been con-
victed (or placed on deferred adjudication) in adult court. By this time,
17-year-old B.T. likely will have turned 18, and juvenile adjudication may
be unavailable. '194 In Lisa Laser, the supreme court emphasized that
"forum-selection clauses should be given full effect, and subjecting a
party to trial in a forum other than the contractually chosen one amounts
to 'clear harassment . . . injecting inefficiency by enabling forum-shop-
ping, wasting judicial resources, delaying adjudication on the merits, and
skewing settlement dynamics." 1 95
In the third category of cases, there is no direct discussion of the ade-
quacy of appellate remedy, yet the facts demonstrate the appellate rem-
edy is indeed inadequate. However, prudent practitioners should not
read the case law to diminish the importance of the issue of whether ap-
pellate remedy is inadequate. There is no indication that the supreme
court has abrogated this element of mandamus relief. For example, in the
case of In re Merrill Lynch & Co., the supreme court did not directly
188. See, e.g., In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d 819, 823 n.2 (Tex.
2010) ("Mandamus is available where a motion to disqualify is inappropriately denied as
there is no adequate remedy on appeal.")
189. In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (citing In re Dickason,
987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998)).
190. Dickason, 987 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Buttery v. Betts, 422 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.
1967)).
191. Buttery, 422 S.W.2d at 151.
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. In re B.T., 323 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); In re Lisa Laser USA,
Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
194. B.T., 323 S.W.3d at 162. Although the court deviated from their standard lan-
guage, it is clear that "no plausible appellate remedy" is encompassed by the requirement
for mandamus relief that there is no "adequate" appellate remedy. See id.
195. Lisa Laser, 310 S.W.3d at 883.
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discuss why Merrill Lynch's appellate remedy was inadequate; but it did
emphasize that if the companion litigation was not stayed, pending arbi-
tration, the company's "bargained-for arbitration rights" would be lost.' 96
Although the phrase "adequacy of the appellate remedy" or something
similar is not used, this statement strongly suggests that loss of contractu-
ally bargained-for arbitration rights could not be remedied by appeal. 197
V. CONCLUSION
This article surveyed the mandamus opinions issued by the Texas Su-
preme Court between November 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010. These
opinions highlight the supreme court's varied approaches to the adequacy
of the appellate remedy element of the mandamus test. In the final anal-
ysis Prudential and its progeny demonstrate mandamus is truly an ex-
traordinary remedy sparingly granted. Mandamus is available for:
[S]ignificant rulings in exceptional cases . . . to preserve important
substantive and procedural rights. . . ,allow[ing] the appellate courts
to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise
prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private par-
ties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring even-
tual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings. 198
Even in light of some apparent anomalies, there appears to be no gen-
eral retreat from the "practical and prudential" approach announced in
Prudential. Nevertheless, before filing a petition for writ of mandamus,
one must understand the nuances of mandamus relief in order to avoid
unexpected barriers that may preclude a successful petition.
196. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 315 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
197. See id. State and federal policies favor arbitration. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52
S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91
(2000)).
198. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004).
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